Employing the one-step stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) approach, this paper examines bank efficiency in China, paying special attention to the ownership, selection effect and dynamic 
INTRODUCTION
China achieved an annual GDP growth of over nine per cent during the past 30 years, becoming the third largest economy in the world next to the USA and Japan. Along with economic reforms, China's banking system has undoubtedly contributed to this miracle.
As China becomes more integrated with the world, its banking system has become more influential in world financial markets. By 2009, three Chinese banks, namely Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), China Construction Bank Corporation (CCBC), and Bank of China (BOC), were rated as the world's three largest banks in terms of market capitalization. The subject is of interest in terms of the role of these banks in providing a degree of financial stability to the world system in the recent financial crisis and its continuing aftermath.
The banking system has been subject to piecemeal but well-planned reforms since the 1980s to better serve economic development and maintain social stability. More radical None of them simultaneously examines the ownership effect, selection effect and the dynamic effect of governance changes on bank performance. This paper attempts to 1 bridge the gap and contribute to existing literature in the context of developing countries and bank privatization.
Employing a one-step SFA model, this paper estimates cost and profit efficiency for 47 commercial banks over the period [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . This is by far the largest dataset on the Chinese banking industry. Most efficiency studies use endogenously determined bank specific input prices by dividing total factor expenses by the total units of factors employed, which is in contradiction with the assumption of cost and profit functions where firms face exogenous input prices in competitive markets (Mountain and Thomas, 1999) . In fact, in literature only a few studies have addressed this issue
1 . This study uses market average input prices to resolve this problem. Estimated cost efficiency and profit efficiency average at 74% and 63% respectively. Both cost and profit efficiencies have improved over data period. In a cost efficiency model, SOCBs are the most efficient banks while Foreign Banks (FBs) are the most inefficient ones. It is found that non-performing loans (NPLs) have inflationary effect on cost efficiency for banks with high level of NPLs. This finding suggests that profit efficiency is a better performance measure. In the profit efficiency model, SOCBs become the least profitable banks and CCBs become the most efficient ones. The selection effect is found for IPOs in the profit efficiency model, that is, more profitable banks have been selected for IPOs. But adverse selection effect is found for both foreign ownership participation and IPOs in the cost efficiency model. In the long-term, both foreign ownership and IPOs tend to improve cost efficiency but worsen profit efficiency.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews literature on bank efficiency in developing and transition countries. Section 3 introduces the Chinese banking system and banking reform. Section 4 outlines research methods. Section 5
analyzes empirical results and section 6 concludes.
BANK EFFICIENCY IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITION COUNTRIES
Despite voluminous literature on bank efficiency, most studies have been undertaken in the US and in European countries. In the last two decades, there has been a rapid development of empirical research in developing and transition economies where market-oriented banking reform has been either completed or underway. Before reform their banking systems shared many commonalities. For instance, banks were functionally segmented by economic sectors; they showed a lack of management skills and credit analysis systems; the banking systems were commonly dominated by stateownership with poor asset quality and weak oversight institutions (Claessens 1998) .
Bank reform has been highlighted on the policy agenda in most transition economies and developing countries. The primary objective is to improve the efficiency of resource allocation and to strengthen the financial foundation of the economy. Although reform strategies vary across countries, reform measures generally include lowering entry barrier, privatization, enhancing the supervisory framework, liberalizing interest rates, and removing credit controls. As a result, efficiency studies attempt to capture the effect of deregulation, financial liberalization, foreign bank entry, and ownership change.
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Ownership has been an important issue. The primary concern is how to find the optimal ownership and management structure which can better tackles the principal-agent problem (Spong et al. 1995) . State ownership has been prevalent in transition and developing countries. The argument for state ownership is that governments are able to channel funds to sectors and projects with low financial but high social returns. On the other hand, state ownership is commonly blamed for poor performance due to various reasons. State ownership theoretically means all citizens are co-owners who in practice have no power and no incentive to influence and monitor the management of state banks.
This free-rider problem leaves governments the only effective representative agent (Huibers 2005) . Governments, however, have multiple (often conflicting) goals other than pure profit maximization. Another reason is the lack of market discipline on inefficient SOCBs and inadequate means of punishing wrong-doing bank managers.
The management of private banks is under pressure to improve bank efficiency as inefficient management would be replaced and banks may be bankrupt when facing financial distress.
Empirical research generally shows a negative association between bank efficiency and state ownership. In transition economies, state-owned banks are found to be significantly less efficient than their private counterparties (Bonin et al. 2005a; Fries and Taci 2005; and Yao et al. 2007 ). There are some exceptional studies. For example, Chen (2005) found that state banks outperformed other types of banks.
As to foreign banks, a home field advantage hypothesis argues that domestic institutions are generally more efficient than foreign-owned institutions due to organizational diseconomies to operate and monitor from a distance and limited access to soft qualitative information. In contrast, a global advantage hypothesis argues that foreign institutions can be more efficient because of superior managerial skills and high quality human capital inherited from foreign owners (Berger et al. 2000) .
A tendency has been found that the home field advantage hypothesis holds in developed countries while the global advantage hypothesis holds in developing countries (Claessens et al., 2001) . In developed countries, it is evident that the home field advantage hypothesis holds (Berger et al., 2000; De Yong and Nolle, 1996; Sathye's, 2001; Chang et al., 1998; and Peek et al., 1999) . In developing and transition economies, the empirical results are less conclusive. A limited form of global advantage hypothesis is supported by Bonin et al. (2005b) and Kraft et al. (2006) Privatization has been a major strategy to improve bank performance by constructing good governance and management structure. Empirical research has shown clear performance improvements after privatization in developing countries and transition economies (Boubakri et al. 2005; Berger et al. 2005 and Williams and Nguyen 2005) .
Foreign ownership participation in domestic banks and bank IPOs are two common privatization methods. Foreign ownership participation is expected to bring in advanced technology, modern banking techniques and superior managerial skills. Empirical literature has found improved performance after foreign investment (Fries and Taci 2005 and Bonin et al. 2005b) . IPOs are expected to incorporate the disciplining role of the capital markets on banks and listed banks are found to be more efficient than unlisted ones (Berger and Mester 1997) .
Only in recent years the study of bank efficiency in China has attracted serious attention.
Existing studies consistently report improved efficiency after more than two decades of reforms. Most studies (Kumbhakar and Wang, 2005; Berger et al., 2009; Yao, et al., 2007; Fu and Heffernan, 2007; and Jiang et al. 2009 ) suggest that JSCBs are more efficient than SOCBs with one exception of Chen et al. (2005) that find SOCBs outperform JSCBs. This paper distinguishes itself from existing studies by using market average input prices to estimate cost and profit efficiency and jointly examining ownership effect, selection and dynamic effects of governance changes on bank efficiency.
BRIEF HISTORY OF CHINESE BANKING SYSTEM AND ITS REFORM
Since the late 1970s, the Chinese banking system has entered into a reforming period, aiming at creating a multi-ownership, competitive and market-oriented banking system. were legally defined as state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) and they were expected to be profit-driven and operationally independent. Their policy lending functions were taken away by the three newly established policy banks 2 . However, these policy banks lacked branch network and capital as well as serving and lending capacity. They were unable to meet the needs of policy lending previously fulfilled by 
METHODOLOGIES, MODEL SPECIFICATION AND DATA
The preferred estimation technique is SFA, developed by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) . SFA pre-specifies a functional form and decomposes error terms into a random error ( ) and inefficiency ( ). It assumes that inefficiencies follow an asymmetrical half-normal distribution and random errors follow a symmetric standard normal distribution. Actually, the SFA is criticized for its pre-specified functional form and distributional assumptions. However, because of the separation between random errors and inefficiencies, the SFA is more appropriate over the non-parametric method in efficiency studies in transition and developing countries where problems of measurement errors and uncertain economic environments are more likely to prevail (Fries and Taci 2005) .
A two-step procedure is commonly employed to estimate a cost and/or profit frontier to derive inefficiencies in the first step and to regress the estimated inefficiencies against a set of possible determinants in the second step. This two-step procedure suffers from serious econometric problems. Inefficiencies are assumed to be identically distributed in the first step but they are assumed to have a functional relationship with a set of variables in the second stage (Kumbhakar and Lovell 2000) . An alternative one-step estimation procedure overcomes these problems. This paper adopts a one-step model proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995) . It is assumed that non-negative cost inefficiencies are a function of firm-specific variables and they are independently distributed as truncations of normal distributions with constant variance but with means that are a linear function of observable variables.
A generalized Battese and Coelli (1995) 
where i and t denote firm and time; is the logarithm of the cost of production of the i-th firm; is a k×1 vector of the logarithm of input prices and output of the i-th firm; a random variable assumed to be iid. N (0, ) and independent of ; are non-negative cost inefficiency, which are assumed to be independently distributed as truncations at zero of the N ( , ) distribution;
β is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated.
Equation (2) shows the inefficiency effects model Equation (3) defines cost efficiency for the i-th bank at the t-th time.
The empirical specification of the cost frontier in translog form is shown in Equation (4). 
where TC is the total costs of a bank in a given year; are outputs; are input prices; is fixed netputs; T is a time trend; are identical and independently distributed random errors, which are independent of ; are non-negative inefficiencies; are adjusted values of logged outputs so that they fall within the where t is a time trend; is a vector of governance effect indicators; GDP is a proxy of macroeconomic environment.
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Employing a modified version of the intermediation approach (Sealey and Lindley 1977) , this paper defines three outputs--total loans, other earning assets and deposits; two inputs--cost of fund and cost of labour; and one netput--equity. Table 1 Theoretically, the price of labour and the price of physical capital should be measured separately. Due to the lack of separate data on labour (i.e. personnel expenses), the price of labour and physical capital is defined as the ratio of non-interest expenses to total assets as in Hasan and Marton (2003) . Labour and physical capital markets are defined by bank types. Market average prices of labour and physical capital are the un-weighted average of the prices the other banks belonging to the same bank type excluding the banks' own price (Koetter, 2005) . The price of funds is defined as the ratio of total interest expenses to total interest bearing funds. Two fund markets are identified. One is a national fund market for domestic banks as the interest rate structure is set by the central bank and commercial banks have been strictly restricted in setting interest rates on deposits and borrowings. Another fund market is for foreign banks as they were not allowed to collect deposits from domestic public before 2007 and therefore their funding sources are different from those of domestic banks. The market average price of fund is computed as the un-weighted average of the prices the other banks excluding the banks' own price. 
Selection Effect Indicators
Selected for foreign acquisition Equals 1 for banks underwent foreign acquisition and 0 otherwise. Selected for IPO Equals 1 for banks underwent IPO and 0 otherwise. The dummies equal zero prior to governance change for all banks and one starting from the change. The inefficiency effect model also includes a time trend variable and GDP growth as a proxy of macroeconomic condition.
Dynamic Effect Indicators

EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Estimation results of the cost and alternative profit functions are reported in Panel A and Panel B of Table 3 . Figure 1 Mean efficiency level (1995 Mean efficiency level ( -2008 Results from the inefficiency effects model (reported in Table 4 ) are of particular interest as they offer insights into the ongoing banking reform. 7 The actual average performance of CCBs would be lower than our estimates. The sample includes only 24 CCBs out of 112 for those data available for at least five years. Banks with better management and performance are more likely to make data publicly available. (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) Notes: CCB = city commercial bank, FB = foreign bank, JSCB = joint-stock commercial bank, SOCB = state-owned commercial bank. (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) Notes: CCB = city commercial bank, FB = foreign bank, JSCB = joint-stock commercial bank, SOCB = state-owned commercial bank.
Table 3 Estimation of cost and alternative profit frontiers using market average prices
Figure 2 Mean cost efficiency by bank types
Figure 3 Mean profit efficiency by bank types
A puzzle has come to our attention that SOCBs are the most cost efficient banks but they are the most unprofitable banks. Our explanation to this puzzle is the huge amount of NPLs in SOCBs has an inflationary effect on cost efficiency. As detailed data on NPLs are not available in China, researchers have to include NPLs in total loans as an output. This inclusion inflates cost efficiency but not profit efficiency because no profits could be generated from NPLs. This effect also explains the pattern of cost efficiency 20 movement shown in Figure 1 . Cost efficiency dropped slightly in 2000, which may be (partially) attributable to the transfer of NPLs of RMB 1.4 trillion from SOCBs in 1999.
In the subsequent 7 years, cost efficiency crept along at an agonizingly slow pace totalling 5 percentage point increase while profit efficiency increased by 37 percentage points at a much faster pace. One possible explanation is that cost efficiency had increased but the increase was offset by the decreasing inflationary effects of NPLs.
Moreover, ABC had the highest NPL ratio among SOCBs, which was almost six times show a strong cherry picking effect that foreign investors have selected more profitable banks to take minority stakes.
As for the dynamic effects of governance changes, foreign ownership participation appears to have increased profit inefficiency in the long run although they have initially picked up more profitable banks. This could be caused by investing activities and more prudential practices, such as more loan loss provision and investment in upgrading technology. These activities will sacrifice profitability at present or in the near future but will benefit the banks in the long run. The IPO strategy is found to improve profit efficiency in the short-term but gains tend to fade in the long-term. Short-term gains are largely attributable to one-off reform before going public rather than from expected good corporate governance.
Although our results show the effect of foreign ownership and IPO strategies are not as effective as expected, they are essential successful steps in China's long match to modernize its banking system. Chinese government has made considerable efforts on attracting foreign strategic investors for its major banks in the hope of foreign owners bringing in superior managerial skills and new technologies. Banks have also been encouraged and actually pushed to go public to become competitive in a free market environment.
The main purpose is to construct good corporate governance structure and improve bank performance. Given the fact that most foreign acquisition and IPOs took place after 2004, it may need more time to realize their effect. Moreover, the upper limit of foreign ownership in domestic banks is still 25 per cent and that for a single foreign investor is 20 per cent while the central government holds a majority controlling stake. It is doubtful whether foreign investors have sufficient power and ability to influence decision making processes in order to apply their operational and managerial skills.
Furthermore, fundamental change in bank management and operations is a complex process. The decision-making process needs to be changed from policy-oriented to profit-driven. This also requires effective and enforceable steps to ensure corporate governance functioning in the long term and to prevent SOCBs from stepping back to their previous managerial and operational behaviours. Policy makers should be aware of the possibility that reform outcomes may depart from the initiative purposes. Bank performance should be closely monitored and any adverse signs should be followed up to ensure banking reform is still on track.
Partial privatization and government intervention might hinder and postpone the success of reforms. The Chinese government has partially privatized SOCBs but still retains a controlling stake that facilitates government intervention in SOCBs' operations.
Existing information and evidence suggest that government intervention still persists and whether it could be reversed in the near future is uncertain. The key to bank reform success is fundamental shifts in banks' management and operations away from a policy orientation. This is unlikely to happen as long as the government has an incentive and power to intervene in SOCBs' operations.
